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Venue Shift Following Devolution: When Reserved Meets 
Devolved in Scotland 
 
This article examines the means used to address blurred or shifting boundaries 
between reserved UK and devolved Scottish policy.  It outlines the main issues 
of multi-level governance and intergovernmental relations in Scotland and the 
initial problems faced in identifying responsibility for policy action.  While it 
suggests that legislative ambiguities are now mainly resolved with the use of 
‘Sewel motions’, it highlights cases of Scottish action in reserved areas, 
including the example of smoking policy in which the Scottish Executive 
appears to ‘commandeer’ a previously reserved issue.  However, most examples 
of new Scottish influence suggest the need for UK support or minimal UK 
interest.    
 
Intergovernmental Relations and Multi-Level Governance 
A common theme of devolution and federalism studies is the entanglement of policy 
issues when decision-making power is vested in more than one actor.  Although most 
political systems outline in detail the policy domains of each level or type of government, 
it is inevitable that the boundaries between policy areas will become blurred in practice.  
There are two relevant approaches to this area of study.  The first – widespread in the 
literature on intergovernmental relations – highlights country level differences according 
to institutional structures, power and the recourse to established authority and formal 
resolution.  This literature may be used to explore the structure of UK relations - is it a 
unitary or union state?  Can it be meaningfully compared with federal, quasi-federal or 
other devolved unions?  What is the strength of the centre and what is the frequency of 
formal dispute resolution? (e.g. Mitchell, 2003; Watts, forthcoming; Horgan, 2004; 
Agranoff, 2004).    The second – associated with the literature on multi-level governance 
– highlights informal relationships and the blurring of boundaries between public/ private 
action and levels of governmental sovereignty.  Decision-making authority is dispersed 
and policy outcomes are determined by a complex series of negotiations between state 
and private interests (see e.g. Bache and Flinders, 2004a; 2004b; Hooghe and Marks, 
2003a; 2003b).   
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A combination of approaches highlights a more widespread finding in the political 
science literature – that the identification of power in terms of capacity is limited without 
demonstration of the exercise of power (Hindess, 1995).  This includes the overt use of 
power to make decisions in the face of opposition.   It also includes discussions of 
agenda-setting and the exercise of power to limit the scope of those decisions.   As 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993: 32) suggest, this often involves competition to define 
policy problems in a certain way to ensure that they are dealt with in a particular decision 
making ‘venue’.  The focus of analysis moves, from the capacity to make decisions, to 
the level of government in which the decisions are made.  Therefore, the complexity of 
governance arrangements and subsequent competition to ensure decision-making 
jurisdiction makes it difficult to predict policy outcomes from the analysis of institutional 
arrangements alone.  This reinforces the need for case study analysis - by country to 
explore the effect of institutions and formal arrangements, by policy area to ensure that 
relationships identified in one field are not atypical, and over time to explore the shifting 
boundaries between policy areas. To address a tendency to interpret intergovernmental 
outcomes in terms of the powers of its dominant participants, these case studies should 
also present competing ‘narratives’ of policy change (see Bevir and Rhodes, 1999).  
 
This article outlines the case of Scotland and the factors underlying its legislative 
relationship with the UK since 1999.  The findings support two narratives of policy 
development.  First, the most common means to address blurred legislative boundaries 
has been the ‘Sewel motion’ which gives Scottish Parliamentary consent for Westminster 
to legislate.  The UK arena is therefore the most likely venue for decision making or 
dispute resolution.  This supports a ‘top-down’ narrative of UK dominance, which 
suggests that the informality of intergovernmental relations is based on a balance of 
power towards Whitehall.  Second, there is scope for policy autonomy through shifting 
the boundaries of the devolution settlement.  This supports a ‘bottom-up’ narrative which 
highlights a strategy of reframing and downplaying issues to ensure that they are dealt 
with in a devolved decision-making venue.  A combination of narratives suggests that 
while UK power is often exaggerated by focussing on a very small number of visible 
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conflicts, the scope for Scottish success depends on political will, the level of UK 
interest, and the strength or visibility of the agenda surrounding each policy issue. 
 
Reserved and Devolved Areas in Scotland 
The Scotland Act 1998 specifies which matters are reserved.   Devolved matters are those 
areas not specified in the Act, as well as some extra powers granted on an ad hoc basis 
(such as the Scottish rail network in 2004).   
 
Table 1 Reserved and Devolved Policy Areas 
Policy Areas Reserved Policy Areas Devolved 
International relations Health 
Defence Education and training 
Fiscal and monetary policy Economic development 
Immigration and nationality Local government 
Drugs and firearms Police and prisons 
Regulation of Elections Fire and ambulance services 
National security Social work 
Employment Housing and planning 
Company law Transport 
Consumer Protection Law and home affairs 
Social Security Environment 
Regulation of professions Agriculture, fisheries, forestry 
Energy/ nuclear safety Sport  
Air transport, road safety The arts 
Consumer Protection Devolved research, statistics 
Gambling  
Equality  
Human reproductive rights  
Copyright Law  
Broadcasting  
Source: adapted from Keating (2005: 22) 
 
While table 1 suggests that these boundaries are reasonably clear, initial governmental 
uncertainty caused some embarrassingly public confusion.  For example, Scotland’s 
Deputy Minister for Justice made 2 press statements on 24th July 2000.  The first vowed to 
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aid central government in the development of the Register of Sex Offenders since this 
involved a reserved power.  The second explained that the register was a devolved 
responsibility (Rhodes et al, 2003: 97).  Early confusion over competence was also 
exploited.  As Parry and Jones (2000) discuss, the lack of a dedicated industry minister in 
the Scottish Executive allowed Scotland Office intervention in industrial policy, including 
the highly publicised saving of the Kvaerner shipyard in Glasgow.
1
  While such teething 
troubles are now healing, there are still blurred boundaries of competence, often 
complicated by the EU dimension.   For example:  
 
 Although environmental and agricultural policy is devolved, half of all 
consultation documents issued by the Scottish Executive in these areas relate to 
EU directives.
2
 The Scottish Executive has delegated responsibility for 
implementing EU directives but the UK is still the member state and formally 
responsible.   
 Even when devolved areas such as health are relatively clear there are still EU and 
UK influences, such as the Working Time Directive on clinical cover in rural 
areas and the new Consultant and GP contracts (see Greer, 2005a and 2005b). 
Medical training and regulation are reserved and groups such as the medical 
Royal Colleges still focus on the UK.   
 The role of professions ensures that devolved areas such as higher education and 
social work maintain a UK focus.   
 UK involvement in Scottish policy is furthered by the reserved nature of the civil 
service as well as cross-cutting or ‘joined up government’ initiatives and the 
reservation of fiscal policy and social security.  For example, housing policy is 
devolved but housing benefit and funding for supported housing is reserved, while 
Treasury rules on local authority borrowing constrain any alternative to housing 
stock transfer.   
 Although the Scottish Executive may attempt to address fuel poverty, it can only 
influence levels of insulation and heating in homes, not the price of fuel or the 
level of income tax/ benefits.   
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 The means to address matters such as child poverty in Scotland also operates 
within the context of reserved income tax and benefits regimes.  Many policy 
responses are second order, focussing on access to devolved public services.   
 The overlap of responsibilities is most apparent in the implementation of reserved 
policies by devolved services.  For example, the Home Office directs Scottish 
local authorities on immigration and controls the use of ‘dawn raids’ by police 
forces when removing unsuccessful asylum seekers (Cairney, 2006a: 19). 
 
As Keating discusses (2005: 18; see also Simeon, 2003: 216), these issues of territorial 
politics are common to modern federal systems with the dual aim of devolving decisions 
and maintaining central control when appropriate.  The differences arise in country-level 
structures and the means used to address these overlaps.  In the UK the unusual nature of 
the former affects the latter.  The UK is asymmetrical in two senses – first because 
devolution was extended to a relatively small share of the population, with Scotland (8.6 
per cent), Wales (4.9 per cent) and Northern Ireland (2.9 per cent) accounting for 16.4 per 
cent; and second because the balance of power is tipped towards UK policy departments 
dealing predominantly with the English population.  As Keating (2005: 120) suggests, the 
centre is faced with a small set of devolved governments which do not match the powers 
of federated or devolved authorities in other countries such as Germany, Spain, Belgium 
or Canada.  Scotland is not part of a collection of powerful regions and the UK does not 
have a ‘supreme constitution’ guaranteeing a level of autonomy for devolved 
governments (Watts, forthcoming). 
 
In the UK, intergovernmental relations are conducted almost entirely through executives 
(rather than parliaments) and while there are formal mechanisms to resolve disputes, the 
tendency is not to use them.  There have been no references of Scottish bills to judicial 
review since this is treated as a last resort and the Scottish Executive is more likely to 
‘remove offending sections’ than face delay (Page, 2005). The Joint Ministerial 
Committee (JMC) was designed to allow central government to call a meeting with the 
territories to discuss issues of working arrangements, the impact of devolved policy on 
reserved areas and vice versa, share experience and consider disputes. However, this has 
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also met infrequently (Trench, 2004).  As Horgan (2004: 122) suggests, there is even an 
‘informal flavour’ to formal concordats since – as in Canada and Australia – these are not 
legally binding.  Further, many avenues for public disagreement have been closed by the 
maintenance of the Barnett
3
 system of finance, links between UK civil servants and the 
shared party of government (Keating, 2005: 122-3).   
 
The role of parties in IGR varies considerably, from Canada with a devolved party 
structure and differentiated party competition by territory, to Germany which has 
integrated parties and formal links to coordinate policy (Horgan, 2004: 122).  In the UK 
there are few signs of formal links and the most important are based on personal 
relationships (2004: 124).  However, such links do not necessarily translate to policy 
convergence since the relatively assertive Henry McLeish was a former UK minister 
while the relatively risk-averse Jack McConnell was not a Westminster MP.  The waters 
are also muddied in Scotland by coalition government and the highest profile disputes 
have resulted from divergent policies associated with the Liberal Democrats (Labour’s 
coalition partners).  However, more recent experience in Wales suggests that, even in the 
absence of coalition, UK and devolved policy convergence is not certain.  The effect of 
territorial electoral pressures and different policy conditions undermines the scope for 
UK party direction.  Therefore, the informal use of IGR through parties may reflect a 
desire to avoid political embarrassment and present a united front rather than a means to 
secure convergence in policy aims.    
 
The top-down narrative: intergovernmental relations, disputes and Sewel motions 
The top-down narrative suggests that this informality in IGR is based on a balance of 
power towards Whitehall and Scottish reluctance to risk its position by pursuing 
conflicting interests in public.  Trench (2004: 513) suggests that the lack of JMC 
meetings reflects UK disinterest: ‘… a clear indicator that devolution is no longer a prime 
concern of the Prime Minister and other politicians … they have disentangled themselves 
from devolution’ (2004: 515-6).  Similarly, Keating (2005: 125) suggests that actors in 
Whitehall often forget about Scotland and neglect to consult, then make statements on 
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UK policy without a Scottish qualification or opt-out.  The structure and frequency of 
IGR may therefore be more about UK dominance than consensus.  
 
This imbalance of power is apparent when disputes rise to the surface. The most high 
profile policy of the first Scottish Parliament session (1999-2003) was the decision in 
Scotland to depart from the UK line and implement the recommendations of the 
Sutherland Report on ‘free’ personal care for the elderly.  The practical effect was to give 
a non-means-tested payment of £145 per person per week for those who qualified for 
personal care and an extra £65 for those who qualified for nursing care (Keating et al, 
2003).  However, these payments removed the entitlement of recipients to the UK 
Attendance Allowance (£38-56) and the Treasury refused to give their saving to the 
Scottish Executive (£22 million).  As Simeon (2003: 225) suggests, if the UK 
government had been sympathetic to the policy a solution would have been found, but 
general Whitehall indifference to Scotland had turned to specific hostility (particularly 
since UK ministers failed to persuade their Scottish counterparts to maintain a UK line).  
This approach was also taken with the issue of Hepatitis C compensation in Scotland, 
with the Department of Work and Pensions threatening to reduce benefit payments to 
those in receipt of Scottish Executive compensation (Lodge, 2003).  This case was taken 
further, with Whitehall delaying Scottish payments on the basis of competence (health 
devolved, but compensation for injury and illness reserved) until it came up with a UK-




Scottish policy on higher education fees also marked a clear departure from the UK line, 
but the extent of divergence was constrained by reserved elements.  The Scottish 
Executive proposed to allow students to defer a £2000 payment until they had reached a 
certain income level following graduation.  While a key recommendation of the Cubie 
Report (on which the policy was based) was a repayment of 2% of income at an income 
level of £25000, this was constrained by existing arrangements in which the Inland 
Revenue collected the fees and student loan payments.  The Scottish Executive may have 
been able to set up a separate system for fee collection, but it could not opt-out of the 
reserved arrangements for student loan payments, which at the time began at 9% of 
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income over £10000 per year.  It therefore deemed the costs to be greater than the 
benefits and accepted the lower threshold (until this was raised to £15000 in the UK by 
the Higher Education Act 2004).   
 
The administration of EU structural funds also demonstrates strong Treasury power.  As 
Keating (2005: 152) suggests, the European Commission has ‘found allies’ in regions 
keen on this additional funding without central government control – particularly since 
the money granted must be seen to be spent and matched by the recipient region.  
However, as Bell and Christie (2001: 147; 2005: 168) discuss, the UK as the member 
state negotiates the funding and treats this as Treasury money (since the UK is still a net 
contributor to the EU).  So any money granted by the EU to Scotland is paid to the 
Treasury which includes this payment within the existing Barnett settlement.  The result 
is that not only does Scotland get no more money, but it also has to devote the agreed 
amount to the relevant project and find matching funding from within its existing budget.  
Similar measures may also be used if the Scottish Executive attempts to raise more 
money through business rates or local authority taxes – the Treasury could merely reduce 
the Scottish settlement by the same amount and remove the incentive to raise money 
beyond acceptable limits.  As a result, Treasury power in raising money combined with 
incrementalism (regarding Scotland’s existing financial commitments) constrains policy 
initiation in Scotland if it has a significant spending element (Bell and Christie, 2001; 
Mitchell, 2004).  
 
UK Legislation as the default action 
This dominance extends to legislation and legislative procedure. As Hazell suggests, 
Westminster produces more legislation for Scotland than the Scottish Parliament does – 
50% more bills per annum of primary legislation and double the amount of subordinate 
legislation.
5
  Further, the most common legislative means to address blurred boundaries 
between reserved and devolved issues has been the use of ‘Sewel motions’, named after 
Lord Sewel, the minister responsible for ensuring the progress of the Scotland Bill 
through the House of Lords in 1998 (Winetrobe, 2001).  The procedure was created in 
anticipation of a small number of instances in which the UK government would legislate 
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in devolved areas, and a Sewel motion is passed by the Scottish Parliament to give 
Westminster the authority to legislate on devolved matters.  As Winetrobe (2005) 
discusses, confusion has arisen over the types of measures taken on the authority of a 
Sewel motion, since a Westminster Act can also authorise a change in Scottish legislative 
functions or a change in Scottish Executive functions (to avoid confusion, this article 
refers to the latter as ‘reverse-Sewel’ motions since they represent a form of executive 
devolution rather than a perceived loss of Scottish powers). 
 
As Cairney and Keating (2004) and Cairney (2005a) discuss, there were 50 motions 
passed from 1999 to April 2005 (excluding 13 reverse-Sewel motions - see below).  31 
were justified mainly on the basis of entangled responsibilities.  Legislation relating to 
crime is a frequent category given its height on the UK’s agenda and the potential for 
legal loopholes.  For example, with legislation on an international criminal court, powers 
of arrest are devolved, but extradition is reserved and with the Proceeds of Crime Act 
drug trafficking, money laundering and taxation are reserved, whilst other civil and 
criminal matters are devolved.  In other areas, domestic policy may have an international 
element, such as arrangements for adoption requiring an approved list of countries, or the 
licensing of firework displays and importation of fireworks.  There are also cases such as 
gender recognition and civil partnerships where the issues seem to relate to devolved 
competence, but a Sewel motion is passed to deal with reserved elements such as the 
extension of benefits and pension rights.  Fourteen motions relate to reserved bodies 
operating in devolved areas or minor administrative anomalies.  These cases foster a UK-
wide approach to maintain consistency of standards.  The areas involved – such as food 
standards, financial services, race relations, health protection and serious organised crime 
– tend to be devolved but with the potential for UK bodies to act in Scotland.  Five Sewel 
motions were justified mainly in terms of expediency (removing the need for identical 
legislation in Scotland) and/ or the need for political uniformity (although most motions 
involve this element).    These include urgent measures related to terrorism, but also to 
measures on postal voting in local elections and the recovery of National Health Service 
(NHS) costs.   
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Rising dissatisfaction of opposition parties with the Sewel process prompted a Procedures 
Committee inquiry into the issue in 2005. The report highlighted the need for more 
information on the timing and substance of motions, an ‘early warning’ system to ensure 
more committee deliberation and more time for plenary debate with the more significant 
motions (this was subsequently endorsed by Westminster’s Scottish Affairs Select 
Committee, 2006: 18).  In other words, the Procedures Committee (2005) reinforced the 
idea that Sewel (or ‘legislative consent’) motions are now routine measures of 
government and the chosen legislative means of addressing blurred boundaries.    This 
suggests a degree of UK dominance of these issues.  Not only has there never been an 
instance in which a Sewel motion resolution has been defeated, but there is also no 
certainty that such a defeat would stop Westminster from legislating.  Since it does not 
need formal permission from the Scottish Parliament to legislate in devolved areas, ‘it 
would be for Westminster to decide whether to legislate on that matter notwithstanding 
the lack of consent’ (Clerking and Reporting Directorate, 2002: 1).   
 
The Bottom-up Narrative: finance, executive devolution and creating policy space 
The ‘bottom-up’ narrative suggests that it is easy to overplay the significance of UK 
constraints by focussing on a very small number of visible conflicts.  Scottish power is 
more subtle and apparent in less formal arrangements.  For example, there is potential to 
influence UK foreign policy,
6
  while the Scottish Executive supplements its limited 
formal rights in the EU with informal channels of contact and influence (as did the 
Scottish Office before it - see Bulmer et al, 2002).  Power is also manifest in the level of 
discretion Scotland enjoys (for example, during the implementation of EU directives).  
Day–to-day policy making takes place in the context of financial arrangements conducive 
to autonomy, while more and more decisions over the detailed direction of policy in 
reserved areas are devolved to the Scottish Executive.  This ‘executive devolution’ was 
apparent before political devolution, but it has now been enhanced by the Scottish 
Parliament’s legitimacy and the greater powers granted to Scottish ministers since 1999.  
In addition, the example of smoking legislation highlights the scope for reframing issues 
to ensure venue shift.   
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The bottom-up narrative suggests that UK disinterest does not equate with dominance.  If 
Whitehall ministers have ‘disentangled themselves from devolution’, then scope exists 
for day-to-day autonomy, particularly since Scotland does not suffer from the lack of 
investment that Bulpitt (1983: 139) associates with the centre’s neglect of the periphery.   
While Scotland appears to lose the public arguments over finance, this should be seen 
within a wider context of spending negotiations.   Part of the reason that the Scottish 
Executive did not pursue the issue on free personal care is that it received a more 
favourable response from the Treasury on interest charges for loans for council housing, 
‘worth more than the amount of attendance allowance at stake’ (Trench, 2005: 11).  As 
Midwinter (2004: 139) discusses, the Scottish Executive received almost £1 billion to 
promote community ownership of council housing on top of the amount agreed through 
Barnett.
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  While debate in Scotland often centres on the ‘Barnett squeeze’, or 
convergence over time between Scottish and English spending, the formula masks a 
process in which the Scottish Executive maximises its funding by stretching Treasury 
rules to their limits (interview, Scottish Executive, May 2005).  Successive Treasury 
‘victories’ over major policy areas, coupled with the appearance of reduced Scottish 
advantage over time may indeed suit both executives, since Scotland works ‘behind the 
scenes’ to supplement its income through side deals and by exaggerating the 
comparability of Scottish and English spending to maximise Barnett consequentials 





The nature of Barnett allows relative autonomy in Scottish spending and as Midwinter 
(2004) suggests, since the Scottish budget process would be incremental regardless of the 
type of funding mechanism, we should examine change at the margins to determine 
Scottish differences.  In this light, Scotland has directed significant levels of funding to 
other policy areas.  Further, since terms such as ‘health’ and ‘education’ are so broad, the 
Scottish Executive can pursue different policies as long as they are broadly in line with 
Whitehall spending commitments (Midwinter, 2004; Greer, 2004). No concerted effort 
has been made by the Treasury to ensure the consistency of expenditure statistics and 
since most policies have elements of a number of policy areas, you can ‘call outputs what 
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you like’, according to the priorities of the UK government and Scottish population 
(interview, Scottish Executive, 2005).  For example, while it would be unwise for the 
Scottish Executive to spend healthcare consequentials elsewhere, there is scope for a 
public health focus with spending directed through local government rather than the NHS 
(interview, Scottish Executive, 2005; Keating, 2005).      
 
Such discussions are reminiscent of pre-devolution debates on the existence of a ‘Scottish 
Political System’ (Kellas, 1973; Paterson, 1994).  Kellas (1973) describes the likelihood 
of autonomy (in policy areas left distinct following the Union) if levels of central 
government attention and potential for political embarrassment are low.  This depends on 
the ability of Scottish actors to frame issues as technical or humdrum while minimising 
the appearance of policy divergence (as in the much fêted social work reforms of the 
1960s).  Success ensures limited Whitehall attention and hence some level of day-to-day 
autonomy, through the discretion involved in implementing policy and directing spending 
priorities.  This was supplemented in the UK arena by the Scottish Office securing an 
agreed line with Scottish interests and acting as the UK’s largest pressure group 
(Midwinter et al, 1991).  Many of these arrangements still exist and the unwillingness of 
the Scottish Executive to ‘rock the boat’ suggests that it still employs resources to secure 
favourable policy outcomes in private (for example, the Scottish proportion of the UK 
spend is still comparable to pre-devolution levels – see Midwinter, 2004).  Further, the 
increased ability of the Scottish Executive to go its own way on policy allows Scotland to 
influence UK decisions.  Indeed, the example of Hepatitis C is one of a number of 
policies (including up-front tuition fees, charging volunteers for background firearm 
checks and tobacco advertising) in which Scottish Executive decisions have ‘forced the 
hand’ of UK ministers (Cairney, forthcoming).   
 
Executive Devolution 
The Scottish Office and Secretary of State for Scotland were first introduced in the late 
19
th
 century as a symbolic gesture to address nationalistic grievances over the way the 
Union was handled in London.  The office grew much more than anticipated following 
the precedent set by its introduction – that when Scotland’s policy circumstances are 
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different, Scotland’s response and administrative arrangements should be different.  As a 
result, although policy was decided at the UK level (with Scottish representation in 
Cabinet), the power to implement and shape public policy was routinely given to Scottish 
ministers (Kellas, 1973; Paterson, 1994; Mitchell, 2003; Keating, 2005).  It is in this 
context that we can view ‘reverse-Sewel’ motions which describe Westminster Acts 
altering the functions of Scottish Executive ministers, allowing them to introduce 
secondary legislation or guidance on specified reserved matters.  This type of executive 
devolution existed before 1999 and was a feature of the initial transfer of functions 
following the Scotland Act 1998 (see Himsworth, 2004: para 29 which discusses the 
main pre-devolution instrument - the Order in Council under s63 of the Scotland Act).  
However, there are now significant differences in the use of executive devolution.  Most 
pre-devolution accounts stress the ability to tailor Scottish policy after UK formulation 
by using the scope afforded by a separate Scottish legal system, administrative structure 
and need for more time to implement (Cairney, 2002).  There were few clear examples of 
Scottish policy initiation.  However, following devolution such powers can be 
supplemented by the legitimacy granted for Scottish action.  The Scottish Executive has 
become a figurehead for a Scottish electorate and issues such as nuclear power and 
asylum demonstrate pressure on Scottish ministers to act even when their responsibilities 
are not clear.   
 
Creating Policy Space in Scotland  
Scottish Executive legislation in 2005 to ban smoking in public places marked a clear 
departure from the UK approach and was criticised by the UK Secretary of State for 
Health (Cairney, forthcoming).
9
  Further, previous attempts (2003-4) to legislate by 
Stewart Maxwell MSP highlight the reserved nature of this policy.  Maxwell was advised 
never to mention workplaces in the same sentence as the legislation to avoid legal 
challenge in the future.  It was also suggested to Maxwell (by a Scottish Executive 
minister) that a Sewel motion was necessary to address reserved aspects of smoking 
policy and the prospect of a private legal challenge.   Indeed, as recently as 2003 Scottish 
Executive civil servants would not discuss a smoking ban with interest groups because 
they deemed it outside their competence.  The smoking ban in Ireland (which inspired 
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Scottish policy change) is based on health and safety and employment law (with, for 
example, bars classed as workplaces rather than public places).  Both are reserved issues 
in the UK and the concordat between the Health and Safety Executive and the Scottish 
Executive reflects this: ‘The regulation of smoking and passive smoking in work places is 
a reserved matter’.10  This constraint is acknowledged in the Scottish Executive’s tobacco 
action plan A Breath of Fresh Air (Scottish Executive 2004a: 26) and in its consultation 
document (Scottish Executive, 2004b): ‘Any laws restricting smoking in the workplace 
on the basis of health and safety would need to be legislated for at the Westminster 
Parliament on a UK basis.’  Yet the Scottish Executive did legislate and the draft 
regulations list workplaces as part of their definition of coverage.  Some effort to reframe 
the issue was therefore necessary to shift the boundaries between devolved and reserved.  
As the Chief Medical Officer of the Scottish Executive (May, 2005) recounts: 
 
I was clear that the tobacco issue was big and had to be tackled.  It is for someone 
else to tell me how to do it.  In the run up to A Breath of Fresh Air [published 
January 2004] I didn’t have a clue what the legislative vehicle would be!  There was 
talk of local government measures or the environmental health control/ substances 
hazardous to health legislation which was there already.  Then the clever people in 
the legal department came up with public places.  This is the right way to do it.  
What we want to do is make the law the servant of the policy and not the other way 
around.  Stuff the law – let it catch up with us!  So there is a big lesson from 
smoking – a new way of politics.   
 
A similar approach emphasising the need to reframe the basis for policy action is 
expressed by Action on Smoking and Health Scotland and Maxwell, while one Scottish 
Executive civil servant confirms the attention to this issue before legislation: 
 
There was a lot of consideration of whether the bill would be competent.  If (as in 
Ireland) it was based on the workplace then we could not do it.  So it had to be done 
on public health grounds.  We can do a lot of things in this way.  There is little you 
can’t get at and a huge raft of things you can do.  It effectively comes down to: is 
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there a will?  The law is effectively definitional – so one man’s workplace is 
another man’s public space (interview, May 2005) 
 
There is some debate about the reserved status of smoking, with health ministers in 
Scotland arguing that this was never an issue in Whitehall and that Scottish Executive 
legal advice did not present any worries over competence if the bill was restricted to 
public health language.  In this light, smoking is the most prominent example of the use 
of the ‘purpose test’ in Scotland to determine the true nature of a piece of legislation.11 
While the legislation affected reserved areas (health and safety; employment), the 
primary aim of the legislation was to pursue public health measures.  The purpose test 
has also been used more frequently for statutory instruments, suggesting that it has 
become a routine measure of government (with most blurred boundaries quietly 
addressed by civil servants).  Yet this disguises the extent of reframing required to 
demonstrate the primacy of purpose, since in other countries the primary driver for a 
smoking ban has been health and safety.  Indeed, when a similar ban was introduced in 
England a year later, the driver for comprehensive measures was MP concern over the 
health and safety of bar workers if pubs or private clubs were exempt from legislation.   
 
Combining Narratives: Sewel motions and constrained autonomy  
The top-down narrative situates a discussion of Sewel motions within the broader context 
of UK IGR dominance.  They are used routinely, have never been defeated and such 
defeat would not necessarily stop Westminster from legislating.  Yet, this is a political 
mechanism and the implications of a defeat would be more significant than the 
constitutional position suggests (Clerking and Reporting Directorate, 2002: 1).  There is 
also significant debate around Sewel motion initiation and whose interests they serve.  
Page and Batey (2002: 513) suggest that most policy initiation comes from the 
‘administration of a UK statute book’ since Scotland has a relatively small administration 
and number of statutes.  The Scottish Executive’s (unpublished) guidance on Sewel 
‘makes clear that most proposals for Westminster legislation in the devolved areas come 
from UK departments rather than Scottish ministers’ (2002: 516).  This proposal comes 
after the legislative slot has been secured and gives Scotland little time to consider the 
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issue.  So while there is no public evidence of unwillingness to cooperate, Scottish 
ministers ‘may find themselves effectively forced to agree to Westminster legislation in 
the devolved areas’ given the uncertainty over devolved government powers and the 
prospect of the UK government referring the issue to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (Page, 2002).  This interpretation contrasts with the Scottish Executive’s 
insistence that most Sewel initiation comes from the Executive.  Sewel selection is a 
pick’n’mix affair following informal contacts and an analysis of upcoming Westminster 
legislation.
12
  While the latter may exaggerate Scottish influence, it is in the interests of 
both governments for the process to appear seamless, allowing loopholes to be closed and 
reducing the likelihood of challenge in the courts (Cairney and Keating, 2004).  The 
Sewel procedure is a convenient tool for a Scottish Executive short of parliamentary time, 
in broad agreement with the aims of the legislation, and in some cases anxious not to be 
seen ‘lagging behind’ England (Page and Batey, 2002: 513-14).  Therefore, in many ways 
the Sewel process says more about executive-legislative than UK-Scottish relations and 
much of the parliamentary criticism of Sewel has arisen because of a perception of the 
subversion of formal parliamentary process.   In other words, while there is a formal 
element to Sewel motions, their use has reflected the UK intergovernmental style of 
informal arrangements between executives.  Further, the innocuous nature of most 




However, the same can be said for the substance of most reverse-Sewel motions which 
merely allow Scottish ministers to implement policy established in a Westminster Act    
There are often tight parameters on Scottish action (in the Gambling Bill the decisions on 
the number and location of ‘super-casinos’ will be made in London), other ways to 
achieve legislative changes (as in Wales which has similar health profession regulators) 
and other ways to achieve the same outcomes (as in lottery fund distribution in Scotland).  
This leaves two particularly significant reverse-Sewel motions.  The first allows Scottish 
ministers to direct Scottish local authorities on employment matters (as part of the agenda 
on the ‘two-tier workforce’ and public-private partnerships – see SPOR 6.2.03 Col 
17837).  The second allows for the transfer of responsibility (and consequent funding of 
over £300 million) for the Scottish rail network to Scottish ministers.  Neither case 
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suggests a huge ‘victory’ in an extension of Scottish powers and each represents a salient 
issue with little electoral gain. 
 
The bottom-up narrative suggests that day-to-day autonomy in Scotland is reinforced by 
Scottish ministers seeking to ‘make their mark’ and shift the boundaries of the devolution 
settlement.  However, this freedom to redefine or reframe may be exaggerated and 
political will in Scotland should be considered within the context of Whitehall acceptance 
of the policy issue.  As Agranoff (2004: 30) argues, such autonomy rests ‘on a foundation 
of supportive intergovernmental relations’ and the experience of Hepatitis C has shown 
that Whitehall departments can obstruct policy on the basis of competence if they are 
concerned about the effects of Scottish action on the UK.  In the case of smoking, while 
the UK Health Secretary merely expressed reservations about completely banning 
smoking in public places, civil servants within the Department of Health were far more 
supportive.  Therefore, the Scottish bill was as much based on implicit UK support
14
 as 
an imaginative solution to devolved competence in Scotland.    
 
This contingent nature of Scottish autonomy is demonstrated by the fact that health and 
safety policy as a whole is still reserved despite pressure within Scotland.  The issue first 
arose after Woolfson and Beck (1999; see also Cathy Jamieson MSP, 2000) argued for 
Scottish Parliament intervention to address relatively high death and injury rates in 
Scotland.  This was taken on by the Scottish Trades Union Council which argued that 
NHS provision (devolved) is deficient for workers since there are insufficient links to, 
and preventative work on, safety and occupational health (reserved).  However, the 
Health and Safety Executive reacted unfavourably to the Woolfson and Beck report and 
has resisted health and safety devolution ever since.  The Scottish Executive has also 
resisted including health and safety in the memorandum of understanding between it and 
the STUC, classing it as a reserved matter even though issues such as the penalties for 
assaulting emergency services workers are devolved.    
 
The recent example of corporate homicide reinforces the reserved nature of health and 
safety.  In December 2005 the Scottish Executive signalled the possibility of separate 
 18 
Scottish legislation going further than UK policy when identifying negligent individuals 
in senior positions in companies (the bill would also address the problem of identifying a 
‘controlling mind’ in Scots law).  This would require a successful purpose test: a 
demonstration that the primary aim of the legislation was to introduce a crime of 
deliberate negligent behaviour to increase public safety (devolved) as well as act as a 
deterrent effect in the area of health and safety of workers (reserved).  However, unlike 
the issue of smoking, the issues had already been raised by the UK government which 
defined the problem in terms of health and safety.    This definition did not shift despite 
extensive Scottish Executive activity.  In what was described as a ‘legal decision’ (rather 
than a negotiation between executives) the problem was reserved to Westminster 
legislation (The Herald 18.7.06 ‘Westminster to rule on corporate killing’).  
 
The evidence in other policy areas is also mixed.  While Scottish ministers may have the 
power of veto over new nuclear power stations in Scotland there is confusion about the 
basis of this power, either through executive devolution (under the Electricity Act 1989), 
concordat, or devolved planning laws.  Media accounts tend to stress the use of planning 
law but the Executive’s position on the basis of power is not clear in First Minister’s 
Question Time (SPOR, 12.5.05, col. 16826-8).  While the steps taken by the First 
Minister to demonstrate his power on this matter may reflect a maturing and more 
assertive Scottish Executive, such a step is unusual and may reflect prior  agreements 
with Whitehall which are subject to change (see Cairney, 2006b: 73).   
 
The issue of asylum seeking also appears to demonstrate significant Scottish involvement 
in a reserved issue, although in this case it may have been forced on reluctant Scottish 
ministers.  As Davis (2005: 17) suggests, Scottish Executive attempts to treat the matter 
as a reserved issue (negotiated between the Home Office and local authorities) were 
largely successful until two crises – the murder of a Kurdish asylum seeker in 2001 and 
the fate of children within the Dungavel Detention Centre from 2003 to 2004 - forced the 
issue of Scottish ministerial involvement up the agenda.  While the first crisis prompted 
ministers to take a formal interest in the delivery of devolved public services to asylum 
seekers, the latter demonstrated a firm Scottish Executive belief that most aspects of 
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Dungavel – including the education of children – were reserved matters (2005: 22).15  
Indeed, the result of civil society pressure in Scotland was the removal of detainees from 
Scotland back to England, rather than a shift in policy towards their treatment within 
Scotland.   Therefore, if anything this example demonstrates the overarching influence of  
reserved policy on public service delivery in Scotland, based on strong interest in the UK 
and direction from Whitehall.  This is well demonstrated by the more recent controversy 
over Scottish police forces (devolved) carrying out ‘dawn raids’ to expel unsuccessful 
asylum applicants on behalf of the Home Office.    In this case, first ministerial 
statements to the Scottish Parliament on the prospect of a formal ‘protocol’ between the 
Scottish Executive and the Home Office – to make the process more ‘humane’ and 
include devolved welfare and social work services – appear to have been rebuffed by the 
Home Office (Cairney, 2006a: 20). 
 
The example of international aid demonstrates more scope for Scottish initiative if there 
is political will to be involved and imaginative ways are sought to exploit blurred 
boundaries.  While this matter as a whole is reserved, it is possible to develop a coherent 
Scottish response based on private fund-raising and using these funds to direct non-
governmental organisations operating abroad without infringing on reserved matters.  
However, again, the UK context is important in two ways.  First, an extension of formal 
links between the Scottish Executive and Malawi may require Foreign Office support and 
Home Office clearance for (for example) medical training in Scotland.  Second, the 
timing for the Malawi initiative coincided with Scotland’s hosting of the G8 summit and 
the UK’s strong pursuit of the poverty in Africa agenda.  In other words, imaginative 
ways to work around reserved areas may not be necessary in the case of a devolved 
government furthering a UK ministerial agenda. 
 
Conclusion 
The comparative study of intergovernmental relations suggests that the UK exhibits an 
unusual combination of features – an asymmetry of population and power, a lack of a 
supreme constitution and a tendency to work informally through executives.   Given the 
internalisation of decision-making and lack of formal dispute resolution producing 
 20 
‘winners and losers’, it is relatively difficult to assess the power of the centre in relation 
to the periphery.   This is compounded by the evidence from multi-level governance - that 
power is dispersed and policy outcomes are the result of a complex series of negotiations 
between state and private interests at more than one level of government.   In particular, 
the identification of ‘first face’ powers to win high profile arguments on reserved and 
devolved issues is qualified by the exercise of ‘second face’ powers to reframe policy 
problems and shift the decision-making venue.  Therefore, while the study of IGR is 
useful in identifying key structures underpinning governmental relations, it does not limit 
the scope for variation in policy outcomes.  As Agranoff (2004: 58) suggests, these vary 
in reflection of the power of devolved governments to initiate policy without central 
government constraint and the willingness of both parties to cooperate.  To this we can 
add the strength or visibility of the agenda which affects not only the attention and 
cooperation from Whitehall, but also the willingness of Scottish ministers to push the 
limits of the devolution settlement 
 
When the scope for variation of outcomes is so wide, the recourse to empirical 
investigation is crucial.   However, more crucial still is the means to interpret specific 
results from a wider theoretical viewpoint.  Hence the value of narratives as a means of 
exploring contrasting lenses through which to view IGR.  The top-down narrative stresses 
UK dominance.  It suggests that the informal nature of IGR reflects the power of the UK 
government to disengage from the process of devolution but still reserve the power to 
decide in high profile cases of disagreement.  The use of Sewel motions reflects this 
dominance, with most issues of blurred boundaries addressed by venue shift back to 
Westminster and Whitehall.  In contrast, the bottom up narrative highlights the discretion 
afforded by Barnett, the subtle victories on public finance that Scotland enjoys if it avoids 
confrontation, the extent of executive devolution afforded by Sewel, and the room for 
policy space if the Scottish Executive is willing to push the boundaries of the devolution 
settlement.  In a sense this is a false or exaggerated debate and a combination of 
narratives suggests that the Sewel process suits the interests of both parties keen to 
present an image of ‘seamless’ devolution.  Sewel says more about the relationship 
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between executives and parliaments, demonstrated by the criticisms by both parliaments 
on the informal nature of IGR even when resolving formal legislative boundaries.  
 
Yet, the value of the narratives is that, when combined with case-study analysis, they 
highlight the narrow constraints within which Scottish autonomy operates.  With nuclear 
power Scottish discretion is afforded by executive devolution; with asylum we see a lack 
of Scottish Executive willingness to intervene; and with international aid we see an 
executive furthering a UK agenda.  Even in the most high profile case of Scotland 
‘reclaiming’ a policy area (smoking in public places) we see that the action was 
underpinned by UK encouragement.  Without such encouragement in other aspects of 
health and safety law the reserved nature of policy has never been successfully 
challenged.  Perhaps ironically, this turns one finding from our introduction on its head.  
The distinction between power as capacity and the exercise of power may be used by 
MLG studies to challenge an assumption of UK power based on its formal structures.  
However, it can also be used to undermine the significance of venue shift based on the 
ability of the Scottish Executive to reframe issues.  As Keating (2005: 10) points out, 
since social work reform is still cited as the key example of autonomy before devolution, 
perhaps ‘not much worth noting had happened since’.   It remains to be seen if the limited 
example of smoking remains the example of autonomy after devolution.   
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 The Scotland Office was formed to act as a conduit between the Scottish Executive and Whitehall, and to 
administer certain reserved aspects of Scottish policy.  The necessity of the office receded as the Scottish 
Executive became more effective.  In June 2003 it was subsumed within the Department for Constitutional 
Affairs.   
2
 Author calculations from www.scotland.gov.uk/Consultations/Archive 
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3
 The Barnett formula, devised in the late 1970s, refers to a block grant based on spending patterns in 
devolved areas (at the time Scotland’s spending was approximately 120% of the UK average) and a 
population-based formula to account for changes in English expenditure.  The squeeze (when expenditure 
rises) refers to the erosion of Scotland’s initial 120% settlement as any marginal increase is at the rate of 
100%.  The formula appears to satisfy Scottish calls for funding based on higher need and English calls to 
reduce Scotland’s share of expenditure in the long run. 
4‘Fury at Reid's Hep C pay-out 'blackmail'‘, The Scotsman, 24.1.04 
5
 Presentation to ESRC conference on devolution, Edinburgh 18.3.05 
6
 The Times, 8.12.04 ‘Executive ‘has role in foreign issues’. 
7
 The funding is contingent on housing stock transfer from councils to housing associations. 
8
 A consequential is a payment made to Scotland when it is established that comparable English 
expenditure in a devolved area has taken place.  
9
 This article draws on interviews with ministers, MSPs and pressure participants in the tobacco policy and 




 See section 29.3 of the Scotland Act 1998  http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en1998/98en46-d.htm 
12
 See the Scottish Minister for Parliamentary Business’ evidence to a House of Lords Inquiry in 2002 - 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldselect/ldconst/147/2051511.htm  
13
 For example, one motion ensures the pension rights (reserved) of emergency service personnel 
(devolved) when engaged in international relief efforts (reserved). 
14
 Perhaps furthering the pre-devolution use of Scotland as a ‘guinea pig’ for controversial policies.   
15
 As with the health or education of armed forces based in Scotland. 
